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We evaluate proposals for independent fiscal authority put forward as a solution to 
excessive public spending. Our main conclusion is that moving the responsibility to 
set broad measures of fiscal policy from the hands of government to an independent 
fiscal council is not necessarily welfare improving. We show that the change is 
welfare improving if nature of uncertainty between fiscal and monetary 
policymakers does not change as a result. However, if this institutional change 
involves considerable decrease of capacity of the new agency to recognize economic 
shocks, citizens' welfare can decrease as a results. This is especially significant in 
times of increased economic volatility such as in a recent global financial crisis. 
Faced with the ambiguous theoretical result, we try to gain deeper insight by 
calibrating our simple model.  
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Global nancial crisis has hit the scal positions of many countries. The main
channels were not only direct government involvement in saving the banking
system, but also drop in tax revenues due to the economic slowdown and
increased costs of long-term debt. As a result, budget decits and the level
of government debt are increasing. Especially in the EU, some countries such
as Greece started to feel the consequences of badly run scal policy of the
past as the level of debt and the expected scal decit reach values which
could bring the country almost to a sovereign bankruptcy. Given that most
of the EU countries run common monetary policy (euro area), serious scal
problems of one of its members could possibly endanger the stability of the
common currency, the euro.
As a reaction to deteriorating scal positions that revealed the impru-
dent scal policy of the past, policymakers started once again to discuss
the agenda how to set scal framework that would prevent accumulation of
decits especially in good times. One can remember that this discussion has
already been led by academics and policymakers in the EU in late 1990s and
early 2000s together with the establishment and reform of the EU's Stability
and Growth Pact. The then debate emphasized that while a rule-based scal
policy that includes decit or debt limits is desirable, it is dicult to safe-
guard the compliance with the rules if scal policy stays in hands of elected
policymakers. Some authors (Poterba (1996), Strauch and von Hagen (1999)
or European Commission (2003)) argued for scal policy to be taken from
the hands of elected governments and to be vested into the hands of indepen-
dent institution. Such an independent institution would set broad measures
of scal policy such as budget decit or public debt.
From a political economy perspective, crisis periods provide a window of
opportunity to change macroeconomic policy frameworks. The experience of
Asian countries after the 1997 nancial crisis shows that the hard landing the
East Asian countries experienced moved them to implement better macroe-
conomic and nancial policies oriented towards economic and nancial sta-
bility so that during the recent global nancial crisis 2007-2009 they stayed
relatively resilient. However, establishing new institutions and policies such
as an independent scal council still within a period of increased economic
volatility may also bring some risks (Saint-Paul (2002)). New institutions
need time to perform well their function, they have to be equipped with
sucient nancial and human resources, the objective must be set clearly
1in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding etc. Thus, the timing of
the set-up and the initial conditions may co-determine the success of such an
independent scal institution.
In this paper we argue that setting up an independent scal council is
a wealth-improving measure under the condition that the institution is able
to identify shocks well (i.e. with at least broadly the same or higher prob-
ability as government, the initial scal authority). We construct a dynamic
microeconomic model of macroeconomic policymaking that involves always
two players (government versus central bank or scal council versus central
bank) which are uncertain about the actions of the other policymaker. We
investigate the claim for an independent scal authority from the point of
view of citizens who prefer optimal and stable economic environment. We
show that in a period of higher economic volatility the failure of the scal
council to recognize shocks has signicant negative eect on the nal welfare
which can even outweigh the positive eects of getting rid of the politically-
motivated scal decit bias. We calibrate the model in order to be able to
quantify the eects in empirical terms. We are able to show that an ill-
designed scal authority with virtually zero ability to recognize shocks and
to optimally react to them that would be established in turbulent times can
decrease general welfare by roughly 20%.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section relates our work to ex-
isting literature. Section 3 introduces the model, derives its equilibrium and
discusses the welfare measure. Section 4 includes our calibration exercise.
Section 5 concludes the paper. Derivation of the model equilibrium is rele-
gated to appendix A1.
2 Relation to other literature
Our work is related to several strands of literature. Most importantly, we
investigate the claim of several authors who call for a designation of inde-
pendent scal authority as a means to prevent excessive public spending and
budget decits run by elected governments (see survey in Debrun, Hauner,
and Kumar (2009) for detailed overview of the topic). In this respect, von Ha-
gen and Harden (1994) and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen (1999)
call for the `National Debt Board' and `National Fiscal Council' respectively.
Both institutions would be independent apolitical institutions which would
set maximum allowable increase of a government debt in each year, limit to
2which proposed public budget would have to comply. In the similar spirit,
Wyplosz (2005) calls for `Fiscal Policy Committee' which would set maxi-
mum allowable budget decit. von Hagen (2003) then proposes `European
Stability Council' as an institution which would focus on change of a public
debt.1
Logic of all the proposals is to vest a broad aggregate of scal policy
into the hands of independent institution following the logic which led to an
institution of independent central banks. This independent scal authority
would set binding limit on a size of public debt or budget decit, while demo-
cratically elected governments would decide about the composition of public
spending and revenues. Argument is that the independent scal author-
ity would not be subject to short-sighted behaviour of elected governments
which leads to the spending bias. Also, by focusing solely on the debt or
decit, the independent scal authority would not be subject to the public
tragedy of commons which is due to the fact that costs of public spending
(deadweight loss of taxation) are not borne by agents who decide about size
and composition of public spending.
All the authors mentioned argue that the proposed independent scal
authority has a potential to improve problematic conduct of scal policy.
While certainly correct, we feel it is a partial equilibrium argument. What
consequences, if any, would result with respect to monetary policy? What
would be a relation between the independent scal authority and the mon-
etary policy-maker? What are the consequences for economic agents and
can this proposed institutional change be evaluated based on some welfare
measure? Those are the questions we try to address in this paper.
In order to do so, we set up a model which can be regarded as belonging to
the Kydland and Prescott (1977) dynamic inconsistency tradition. In spirit,
our model is similar to Barro and Gordon (1983) model. Dierently from
most of the work this paper initiated, our model explicitly allows for scal
policy and is thus more suited for an investigation of the questions we ask.
Rather than surveying whole strand of literature which followed Barro and
Gordon (1983) which has been surveyed elsewhere (see chapters 4 through
6 in Drazen (2000) or chapters 15 and 17 in Persson and Tabellini (2000)),
there are three papers closely related to ours in that they explicitly deal with
1 For proposals intended to solve the excessive public spending and decit problem
that do not require scal policy to be (partly) taken from the government, see Boonstra
(2005), Saraceno and Monperrus-Veroni (2004) or von Hagen and Harden (1995).
3scal policy.
First is Alesina and Tabellini (1987) paper. They specify a model in
which central bank sets ination and scal authority taxes. Their model
diers from ours in objectives of both policy-makers. Output, ination and
public expenditure enter a loss function of both policy-makers, possibly with
dierent weights. In our model, central bank cares only about output and
ination and scal authority cares only about output and public budget
decit. Their paper also diers in questions asked. They investigate welfare
impact of commitment and of degree of central bank independence. We
focus on the welfare impact of dierent institutional setups which dier in
an identity of scal policy-maker. Furthermore, our model includes stochastic
shocks hitting an economy and thus allows for a case of imperfect information
between the policy-makers.
Second closely related paper is Dixit and Lambertini (2003). They focus
on a role of discretion and commitment in a model with scal and monetary
authorities. They allow for two types of interaction of both players. One
in which both authorities move simultaneously and second in which one of
the authorities moves rst. Their work diers from ours in that they focus
on dierent questions. Furthermore, in their model loss function of the scal
authority is identical to social welfare function. In our model, scal authority
has a loss function of its own.
Third closely related paper is Lambertini and Rovelli (2003). Their model
has again scal and monetary policy and they investigate an impact of rela-
tive timing of decisions of both policy-makers, allowing for simultaneous or
sequential decisions to be made. In their model government has loss function
equal to social welfare function. But government can delegate scal policy
to be made by non-independent institution government cannot control fully
- bureaucracy - with a dierent loss function. Again, their model diers in
questions asked and in loss functions dierent players possess.
All the models mentioned above also dier in details of economy they
specify but share in common (including our model) two features. First is an
eect of unexpected expansionary monetary policy which has positive eect
on output. Second is a positive eect of expansionary scal policy (Dixit and
Lambertini (2003) subject to parameter constraints).2
2 There is another strand of literature related to our work that uses models with
multiple scal authorities and unique monetary authority (monetary union setup). We
do not survey this literature here for the sake of space. Nevertheless, it can be divided
43 Model
We study very simple model of interaction of scal and monetary policy. We
use basic insights of the dynamic inconsistency literature which has tradi-
tionally dealt with monetary policy and extend it to an environment which
incorporates scal policy as well.
The model has three players. Fiscal policy-maker, monetary policy-maker
and general public (government, central bank, citizens). There are three
basic equations. First one is an expectation-augmented Phillips equation in
the form
y(I;I) = y
 + ((I)   
e) + (d(I)   d
) + " (1)
where y(I;I) is (log)deviation of output from its natural level y, (I) is
ination set by the monetary authority, e is rationally expected ination by
citizens based on the past behaviour of monetary authority, d(I) is budget
decit set by the scal authority and d is optimal level of budget decit.
Both policies (I) and d(I) and hence output y(I;I) are dependent
on information sets I and I of the policy-makers. Those are explained in
detail below.
Parameters  and  denote eectiveness of monetary and scal policy
respectively so it is natural to limit our attention to f;g 2 h0;1i2. Shock "
is i:i:d: normal, zero-mean shock with constant variance 2, i.e. " s N(0;2).
It can be observed by policy-makers and is not observed by the public.
Our choice of behaviour of the economy warrants further comments. Note
that implicit assumption about monetary policy in (1) embodies a notion
of long-term neutrality of money as well as an idea that only unexpected
changes in monetary policy have an impact on output. Any level of ination
chosen by the monetary authority will not inuence real side of the economy
once public expectations incorporate this level of ination. In a sense, what
we are assuming is that the monetary authority possesses only a nominal
instrument.
On the other hand, assumption behind (1) concerning scal policy is that
by choosing certain level of budget decit, scal authority has the power to
into two strands. First one deals with an eect of unication, see e.g. Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998) or Cooper and Kempf (2000). Second one deals with a question whether
coordination of national scal policies with each other and eventually also with monetary
policy can be welfare improving. For this, see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (2007) or survey in
Beetsma, Debrun, and Klaassen (2001).
5inuence output without a need to be concerned about changes in publics'
expectations. In other words, scal authority can inuence real side of the
economy. We think both assumptions capture important aspect of working
of economy and are quite realistic. What seems to be unrealistic is our
assumption, made purely on convenience grounds, that both authorities can
set their instruments perfectly, which is certainly not true in the reality.
One possible concern arises with our notion of optimal budget decit. In
one interpretation, d = 0, which is relevant in a long-term context when the
scal authority surely must keep its budget decit balanced on average in
order not to become insolvent. However, we do not make such an assumption
and let d to take on any (reasonable) value, since in reality there might be
prolonged periods when its optimal to have either positive (e.g. expectation
of ageing of population) or negative (e.g. debt nanced public investment in
developing countries) budget decit.
Second key equation is government's loss function
G = E

(y(I;I)    y)




and third key equation is central bank's loss function
M = E

(y(I;I)    y)




where E() and E() denote expectations of central bank and government
respectively. Parameter  () denotes the weight central bank (government)
attaches to squared deviations of  (d) from its bliss level  (d) relative to
squared deviation of y from  y ( y). It is natural to assume f;g 2 R2
+. For
political economy reasons,  yi y = ki where ki is any non-negative constant
for i 2 f;g.
Government minimizes its loss function (2) by choosing d subject to con-
straint represented by the economy equation (1) taking behaviour of central
bank and expected ination as given. Similar holds for the central bank that
sets 3.
Before any of the policy-makers makes a decision about the policy, nature
determines a size of the shock " and whether given policy-maker observes it.
Central bank observes the shock with probability p and government with
probability p.
3 As to the central bank, it is believed in the so called `divine coincidence' (Gersl
(2007), Blanchard (2005)), i.e. the idea that stabilizing ination is under some reasonable
assumptions equivalent to stabilizing output around its natural level.
6Denote by I central bank's information set and by I government's in-
formation set. By abuse of notation, I = 1 if " 2 I, i.e. if the central bank
observes the shock, and I = 0 if " = 2 I, i.e. if the central bank does not
observe the shock, and similarly for the government. Last piece of notation
is "(I) with the meaning "(I = 1) = " and "(I = 0) = 0.
Solving the model amounts to nding expressions for (I), d(I) and
y(I;I) which maximize policy-makers' expected utility given constraint rep-
resented by economy equation (1), given behaviour of the other policy-maker
and with citizens expectations being correct. We relegate detailed derivation
of the equilibrium into appendix A1 in which we show that the equilibrium
ination can be expressed as
















 + 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)
 + 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)
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)
"(I): (4)
Similarly, equilibrium decit is given as
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)
"(I): (5)
Finally, equilibrium ination and decit can be used to calculate the
7output, which is given by
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Equilibrium ination given by (4), decit given by (5) and output given
by (6) can be used to calculate variance of ination, decit and output.
To simplify our discussion below we focus on the case with k = 0 or in
other words we assume that the central bank targets natural level of output.
This simplication is made only for convenience as our focus is institutional
change which involves scal policy and having k 6= 0 would not alter any of
the results below.
To evaluate welfare under the dierent institutional arrangements we use












for v 2 fy;;dg and i 2 fcb;fcg where cb stands for current setup in which
government sets decit and central bank ination and fc denotes scal coun-
cil institutional setup. The welfare function embodies both, citizens' prefer-
ence for an economy to be close to its optimum and citizens' preference for
a stable economic environment.










var(v) =  2
2
where  1 > 0 and  2 > 0. To show the following results we will need
some additional notation. Denote by  = [;;;] 2 R2
+  [0;1]2 = Q a
8vector of parameters capturing policy eectiveness and policy preferences.
Furthermore, denote by p = [p;p] 2 [0;1]2 = P vector of probabilities of
observing the shock by the policy-makers. Furthermore, let XO denote an
interior of a set X. To make dependence on the parameters explicit, denote
 1 by  1(;p) and  2 by  2(;p). Then the welfare can be written as
W(;p;k;
2) =   1(;p)k
2
    2(;p)
2: (7)
We assume that the institutional change from cb to fc does not change
policy eectiveness or policy preferences regarding trade-o between ination
or decit and output. In other word we assume  is not aected by the
institutional change. Furthermore we assume the institutional change has no
eect on the variance of the economic shocks 2.
On the other hand the institutional change alters the target output of
a scal policy-maker. We assume that the cb institutional environment is
characterized by k > 0 while the fc institutional environment is character-
ized by k = 0. The last thing the institutional change can aect is nature
of policy uncertainty. Hence we assume that the probabilities of observing
shocks by the policy-makers under the cb institutional setup are p = pcb while
under the fc institutional setup those are denoted by p = pfc.
Substituting into the welfare function the cb institutional setup is char-
acterized by Wcb = W(;pcb;2;k) while the fc institutional setup is char-
acterized by Wfc = W(;pfc;2;0) with the institutional change increasing
welfare if Wfc   Wcb > 0. With this we can prove following.
Proposition 1. [welfare improving institutional change] If the institutional
change does not aect nature of uncertainty between the policy-makers then
it is welfare improving.
Proof. For pcb = pfc = p welfare under the two institutional arrangements is
Wcb(;p;
2;k) =   1(;p)k
2
    2(;p)
2
Wfc(;p;
2;0) =   2(;p)
2
with dierence being Wfc   Wcb =  1(;p)k2
 > 0.
Intuitively in our model the uncertainty between the policy-makers presents
a cost of having two institutions participating in economic policy-making. If
nature of uncertainty is not aected by the institutional change, the only
eect is removal of the scal policy-maker's incentive to induce high output.
9As this incentive creates sub-optimally high output and decit on the one
hand and sub-optimally low ination on the other, removing it is welfare
improving.
While the rst result is a positive one, the second results we prove is a
negative one.
Proposition 2. [welfare reducing institutional change] For any generic  2
QO, any k 2 R+ and any pcb 2 PO there exists 2 and vector of probabilities
pfc such that the institutional change from cb to fc is welfare reducing.
Proof. Fix generic , k and pcb. We want to show there exists (pfc;2) such
that W(;pfc;2;0)   W(;pcb;2;k) < 0. First note  2(;p) is continuous







for generic . It follows there exists pfc in the neighbourhood of pcb such
that  2(;pcb) <  2(;pfc). Since W(;pfc;2;0)   W(;pcb;2;k) < 0
rewrites as k2
 1(;pcb) < 2( 2(;pfc)    2(;pcb)) where the both sides of
the inequality are positive it follows there exists 2 for which the institutional
change is welfare reducing.
Intuitively, the result relies on the fact that we can always nd a direction
in which nature of uncertainty induces a higher  2 in the variance term of
the welfare function. As this term multiplies 2 we can nd high enough
variance of the economic shocks which out-weights any benet from k = 0.
4 Calibration
To shed more light on the issue we calibrated the model. We use  = 0:645
from Mishkin (1983),  = 0:552 from Perotti (2002),  = 2 from Taylor
(1999) and  = 1 the last of which is set to capture an idea that scal policy-
makers are in general believed to be more concerned about output compared
to monetary policy-makers.4
4 Mishkin (1983) comes from table 6.5 on page 122 and captures the eect of unantic-
ipated money growth on log of GNP estimated from US data. Perotti (2002) comes from
table 3 on page 44 and captures eect of government spending increase equal in size to 1%
10To calibrate k we do the following. First, we take our model and solve its
version for the institutional setup when government sets both monetary and
scal policy. The resulting expected ination is then subsequently subtracted
from the expected ination in the model where government sets decits and
central bank sets ination. Resulting dierence is a function of  and k only.
We set k so that the term is equal to 0:7 which is a dierence between 3:8
and 3:1 both of which are average ination rates under the corresponding
institutional arrangements from Bordo and Schwartz (1999).5 Note that this
gives us k = 2:17.
Finally to derive 2 we use var(y) = 7:84 from Basistha and Nelson (2007)
along with other parameters in :6 One problem is that we need probabilities
in p to evaluate var(y). In order not to bias our results in a particular way
we maximize and minimize var(y) for a xed value of  which gives us two
values of p, pmin and pmax respectively. In the calibration exercise we then
use an average of pmin and pmax which turns out to be [0:5;0:5]. Overall this
gives us 2 = 11:49.
Figure 1 shows result of the calibration exercise. Assuming probability
that the central bank observes shocks does not change shaded area in the pic-
ture shows all combinations of p before (pcb
 ) and after (p
fc
 ) the institutional
change under which this change is welfare reducing.
What the gure shows is that the institutional change we study can be
welfare reducing if the newly established scal authority has considerably
lower probability of assessing state of an economy compared to government,
a scal authority before the change. The gure also shows that a room
for the institutional change to decrease welfare shrinks with an increase in
probability of central bank observing economic shocks.
of GDP on log GDP. We take one quarter eect and average over estimates for US, UK,
Germany, Canada and Australia. Finally Taylor (1999) comes from table 7.1 on page 330
(middle column) and is estimated on US data. As the estimates imply that a monetary
authority reacts twice as strongly to ination compared to output, we set  = 2.
5 The ination of 3.8 is average over US, UK, Germany, France and Japan over the
1946-1970 period, i.e. before the recent wave of increases in central bank independence.
The 3.1 is an average for the same countries over the 1983-1995 period. We drop the
intermediate period as the ination was inuenced by dierent factors. All the data come
from Bordo and Schwartz (1999) table 4.1 on page 205.
6 Notice var(y) can be interpreted as a variance of output gap since var(y) = var(y  
y). The value then comes from Basistha and Nelson (2007) table 2 on page 505. We rst
calculate average standard deviation of their proposed two measures of output gap and
square it.
11Figure 1: Calibration of the model














Our proposition 2 suggest that an increase in volatility of economic en-
vironment decreases a potential for institutional change involving establish-
ment of independent scal council to be welfare improving. In order to con-
rm this intuition we repeated the calibration exercise for value of  doubled
with gure 2 showing the result.
Comparing the two pictures the intuition turns out to be correct. The
shaded region is considerably larger in gure 2 compared to gure 1. It is also
considerably closer to the main diagonal of the gure which, by proposition
1, includes points for which the institutional change under consideration is
welfare improving.
Finally, we were interested in extent of potential welfare losses. We eval-
uated welfare change stemming from the institutional change as a percentage
of the pre-change welfare. Figure 3 depicts resulting percentage change in
the welfare as a function of p assuming a scenario with probability of scal
policy-maker observing the shock before the institutional change being unity
and after the institutional change begin zero. We have picked this scenario
as the gure 1 suggest it is the worst case one.
Message of the gure 3 is clear. Potential welfare loss produced by the
institutional change is rather sizeable if it induces large change in an ability
of scal policy-makers to assess state of an economy. For an extreme scenario
we consider here, potential welfare loss is somewhere between 5% and 15%
12Figure 2: Calibration of the model (doubled )














Figure 3: Percentage welfare change for pcb
 = 1, p
fc
 = 0






13depending on an ability of monetary policy-maker to detect economic shocks,
even for the low value of 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the claim that a conduct of scal policy should be dele-
gated to an independent institution in a dynamic microeconomic model that
recognizes the fact that scal policy interacts with monetary policy. Once
the interdependence between both policies is recognized and the volatility of
economic environment taken into account, scal policy delegation needs not
be welfare improving.
Our model focused on two aspect of the proposed institutional change
towards independent scal authority. First aspect relates to the motivation of
elected governments to run excessive public decits that would be eliminated
by delegating some features of scal policy (mainly setting the decit or
debt levels) to independent scal council. If this is the only change the
institutional change induces, then it is unambiguously welfare improving.
Second aspect we focus on is the potential change in the interaction of
the policymakers. In our model this is captured by a change in nature of
uncertainty between the policy-makers regarding information they posses
about the current state of an economy. Once the potential for change in
the probability of recognizing the shocks and the consequences for mutual
interaction of both policymakers are recognized, the institutional change we
consider needs not be welfare improving.
Given the ambiguous theoretical result, we calibrated the model to em-
pirically estimated parameters. The calibration exercise leads to three main
conclusions. First, institutional change can be welfare reducing if the new
independent scal policymaker is signicantly less able to assess the state of
the economy than the initial policymaker (i.e. government, or ministry of
nance, respectively). Second, the room for the welfare reduction increases
with volatility of economic environment. Third, the welfare losses can be
signicant, reaching some 5% to 15% of welfare in calm times and roughly
20% to 25% in turbulent times.
We interpret the results as follows. Generally, establishing independent
scal council is a desirable institutional change. However, under certain con-
ditions, namely if the probability of the new agency to recognize shocks to
the economy is low, the institutional change does not have to be necessarily
14welfare improving. The negative eect of ill-designed institution with low
capacity to recognize shocks increase signicantly in times of increased eco-
nomic volatility such as in a recent global nancial crisis. Given the fact
that turbulent times (i.e. crisis periods) often open a window of opportu-
nity for institutional reforms that would not be available in normal times,
the conclusion of the analysis should be taken into account when discussing
institutional changes in scal framework.
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A1 Appendix
We now explicitly derive equilibrium policies given in the main part of the
paper. Restating the three main equations we have economy described by
y(I;I) = y
 + ((I)   
e) + (d(I)   d




(y(I;I)    y)




and central bank's loss function
M = E

(y(I;I)    y)




Dierentiating and rearranging loss functions of both policy-makers gives
two F.O.C.'s (it is easy to check that S.O.C.'s are satised)
d(I) = d
 +




2e +  + k   E[d(I)   djI]   "(I)
2 + 
: (A5)
Expectations of both policy-makers are given by
E[d(I)   d
jI] = E[d(I = 1)   d
jI]p (A6)
+ E[d(I = 0)   d
jI](1   p)
E[(I)   
ejI] = E[(I = 1)   
ejI]p (A7)
+ E[(I = 0)   
ejI](1   p)
where for example (A6) reads as follows: central bank forms its expecta-
tion about the dierence between d and d as the dierence d   d when
government observes the shock, which happens with probability p, plus the
dierence d   d when government does not observes the shock, which hap-
pens with probability 1   p. Interpretation of (A7) is similar.
To derive (A6) we use F.O.C.'s to get
E[d(I = 1)   d
jI = 1] =
k   E[(I)   ejI = 1]   "
2 + 
for the case when central bank observes the shock and assumes that govern-
ment also observed the shock since
EfE[(I)   
ejI = 1]jI = 1g = E[(I)   
ejI = 1]
E["(I = 1)jI = 1] = ":
18For the case when central bank does not observe the shock and assumes that
the government did observe the shock we get
E[d(I = 1)   d
jI = 0] =




ejI = 1]jI = 0g = E[(I)   
ejI = 0]
E["(I = 1)jI = 0] = 0:
For the case when central bank does observe the shock and assumes that the
government did not observe the shock we get
E[d(I = 0)   d
jI = 1] =




ejI = 0]jI = 1g = E[(I)   
ejI = 0]
E["(I = 0)jI = 1] = 0:
For the case when central bank does not observe the shock and assumes that
the government also did not observe the shock we get
E[d(I = 0)   d
jI = 0] =




ejI = 0]jI = 0g = E[(I)   
ejI = 0]
E["(I = 0)jI = 0] = 0:
To derive (A7) we use F.O.C.'s to get
E[(I = 1) 
ejI = 1] =
(   e) + k   E[d(I)   djI = 1]   "
2 + 
for the case that government observes the shock and assumes that the central
bank also observed the shock since
EfE[d(I)   d
jI = 1]jI = 1g = E[d(I)   d
jI = 1]
E["(I = 1)jI = 1] = ":
19For the case that government does not observe the shock and assumes that
the central bank observed the shock we get
E[(I = 1)   
ejI = 0] =




jI = 1]jI = 0g = E[d(I)   d
jI = 0]
E["(I = 1)jI = 0] = 0:
For the case that government does observe the shock and assumes that the
central bank did not observe the shock we get
E[(I = 0)   
ejI = 1] =




jI = 0]jI = 1g = E[d(I)   d
jI = 0]
E["(I = 0)jI = 1] = 0:
For the case that government does not observe the shock and assumes that
the central bank also did not observe the shock we get
E[(I = 0)   
ejI = 0] =




jI = 0]jI = 0g = E[d(I)   d
jI = 0]
E["(I = 0)jI = 0] = 0:
Substitution of the above expressions into (A6) gives
E[d(I)   d




E[(I)   ejI = 0]
2 + 
(1   p) (A8)
 




jI = 0] =
k   E[(I)   ejI = 0]
2 + 
(A9)
20and substitution into (A7) gives
E[(I)   
ejI = 1] =












ejI = 0] =




E[(I)   ejI = 0]
2 + 
:
Note that expressions (A8), (A9), (A10) and (A11) constitute system
of four equations with four unknown terms involving E() and E() with
solution given by
E[d(I)   d
jI = 1] =  




[2(1   p) + ]p"
 + 22(1   pp)
E[d(I)   d
jI = 0] =  




ejI = 1] =




[2(1   p) + ]p"
 + 22(1   pp)
E[(I)   
ejI = 0] =
(   e) + (2 + )k   2k

(A15)
with  = 2 +  > 0 and  = 2 + 2 + .
21Substituting (A12) and (A13) into the central bank's F.O.C. (A5) gives




(2 + )k   2k

(A16)








[2(1   p) + ]
 + 22(1   pp)
"
for the central bank's optimal ination depending on whether central bank
observed the shock (equation (A17) applies) or not (equation (A16) applies)
which does not involve expectations of the government. Equations (A16)
and (A17) can be used to derive ination expected by citizens. Using e =










which substituted back into (A17) and (A16) gives equilibrium ination
















 + 2(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
":
Using the equilibrium ination to derive    e, expressions (A14) and
(A15) become
E[(I)   
ejI = 1] =  




ejI = 0] = 0 (A21)
which used in government's F.O.C. (A4) gives expression for equilibrium
decit










 + 2(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
":
22Finally, equilibrium ination and decit can be used to calculate the
output, which is given by





   22(1   p)(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
"





 + 2 + 22p(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
"





 + 2 + 22p(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
"






Equilibrium ination given by (A19), decit given by (A22) and output
given by (A23) can be used to calculate the variance of ination, decit and
output. To calculate welfare few more results are useful.
Denoting
1 =
 + 2(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)
2 =
 + 2(1   p)
 + 22(1   pp)














which after some algebra gives
var(y) = [p(1   1)
2 + p(1   2)
2 + 1   p   p + 2pp12]
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